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Chapter 1 – Australia’s first Act 
 
The beginning 
In 1905, Australia passed its first federal Copyright Act. The Act’s 
probable author, John Henry Keating, declared it to be superior to any 
other copyright legislation in the English-speaking world.1 It introduced 
regulatory innovations and it helped to precipitate the movement 
towards copyright legislative unity in the British Empire. 
Most importantly, it marked the first and last time that Australian 
legislators made copyright law free from compulsion to accept the 
normative impositions of the Berne Convention of 1886 and other 
international agreements – or Britain itself. The Senate debate on the 
copyright term marked the last time that the issues raised in the greatest 
copyright controversies of the previous 200 years – the British debates 
over perpetual copyright and the posthumous term – were 
substantively aired in an English-speaking parliament. 
As a result of the freedom they enjoyed to make copyright law as they, 
and not the members of the Berne Union,2 saw fit, Australian 
parliamentarians did something in 1905 that would be impossible today. 
Motivated by support for the creative and public interests and hostile to 
the idea of copyright becoming a commodity in the hands of  
producers, then principally represented by publishers, they said the 
term of copyright should not greatly exceed the life of the owner. They 
shortened the term offered in the Bill (life plus 30 years) and accepted a 
limited conception of copyright as the property of authors, not  
the third parties who might put the author’s work to various 
commercial uses. 
                                                     
1 “I think I am not far wrong in saying that in 1905 Australia led the way so far as 
legislation on the subject of copyright is concerned.” – Senator J H Keating quoted 
in Hansard 23 October 1912.  
2 Australia became a member of the Berne Union in 1928. Until then Britain 
extended the benefits and obligations of the Convention to Australia under section 
8(1) of the 1886 International Copyright Act. Though independent, Australian 
legislators were culturally influenced by Britain and generally sympathetic to the 
thinking of the imperial Government. Very few would choose to pass legislation 
inconsistent with treaties entered into by Britain.  
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Before Federation 
In the 19th century, Australian colonies other than Tasmania, borrowing 
definitions and concepts from the 1842 British Copyright Act, passed 
copyright legislation that required the authors of books, dramatic or 
musical pieces, or works of fine art (drawings, paintings, photographs, 
engravings and works of sculpture), to register their creations with 
central registries in each colony. Ownership conferred the “sole and 
exclusive right and liberty of making, printing, writing, drawing, 
painting, photographing, or otherwise howsoever multiplying copies of 
any matter, thing to which the said word is herein applied”. A 
performing right applied to registered dramatic or musical pieces.  
NSW passed copyright Acts in 1852 and 1879, Victoria in 1869, South 
Australia in 1878, Queensland in 1887 and Western Australia in 1895. 
Queensland passed separate Acts governing the registration of 
copyright in books and dramatic pieces and works of fine art. Colonial 
copyright provided incomplete protection to authors. A colonial author 
who published a copyright work in Britain obtained copyright in all 
British possessions by the operation of imperial copyright legislation. 
Until the imperial International Copyright Act 1886, publication in a colony 
brought protection only in the colony. After the federal Copyright Act 
of 1905 came into force in 1907, the States gradually devolved their 
copyright registration functions to the federal Attorney General’s 
Department in Melbourne.  
In 1905, Australian legislators could draw little guidance from the 
parochial native statutes, which principally established rules of 
registration and administration. British law offered precedents and 
principles to draw upon, but the copyright law in the imperial centre, 
described in about 20 statutes, bemused politicians in Britain and her 
dominions. Australians trying to fashion a new federal copyright law 
from British principles were forced to navigate ancient British 
legislation dealing with copyright in printed material, engravings and 
sculptures, newer statutes dealing with dramatic, literary, musical, 
lecture and fine arts copyright, and international copyright Acts which 
applied rules throughout the Empire.3  
                                                     
3 Print Copyright Act 1777, Engraving Copyright 1734, Sculpture Copyright Act 1798, 
Dramatic Copyright Act 1833, Copyright Act 1842, Lectures Copyright Act 1835, Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 1862, An Act to Amend the Law in relation to International Copyright 1844 
and International Copyright Act 1886.  
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Origins of the Copyright Act 1905 
In 1905, some members of Parliament doubted the necessity for a 
federal copyright law. In the Upper House, Senator Hugh De Largie4 
said the case for legislation was weak: “I am in favour of the idea of 
having a Copyright Act, but at the same time it should have been  
made clear that there is a pressing necessity or call from the country for 
a law of this kind. I know of no such demand having been made … So 
far, the necessity for the introduction of this Bill has not been 
satisfactorily explained.”5 
Another Senator, Staniforth Smith, said: “the British Acts are 
somewhat vague, and there is a multiplicity of them … This Bill can 
only be considered as a complement to the British Act.” As De Largie 
said, the country did not cry out for copyright legislation. If, as he 
implied, legislators should respond to national necessity, there were no 
grounds in 1905 to enact the Copyright Act. No-one suggested publicly 
the need for a new copyright law. Even Senator Josiah Symon,6 an 
advocate of the legislation, acknowledged the absence of “urgency for 
this measure”. 
The new Act resulted from political enthusiasm. The agents of reform 
were politicians in a rush, to whom the heads of federal powers set out 
in section 51 of the Constitution were not distant abstractions but the 
source of a new creation. During the first decade of Federation, 
Parliament legislated under no less than 32 of the 39 heads of power 
conferred by section 51, a striking indication of a feeling among 
parliamentarians that they must justify as soon as possible the mandate 
for federal power conferred by the framers of the Constitution. 
By 1905, Parliament had already exercised the copyright power7 to pass 
the Patents Act of 1903. It did stop with patents and by 1906 completed 
the portfolio of copyright and industrial property legislation: the 
Copyright and Trade Marks Acts were passed concurrently in 1905, 
followed a year later by the Designs Act. In each case, with the possible 
exception of the Patents Act, the country did not need a federal statute. 
                                                     
4 Hugh De Largie 1859-1947, Senator WA 1901–23 (Lab; National Labour; 
National).  
5 Hansard, 29 August, p1634.  
6 Sir Josiah Symon, 1846–1934, Senator SA, 1901-13 (Free Traders; Anti-Socialist), 
Attorney-General 1904–05.  
7 Section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution conferring the power to legislate with respect 
to Copyrights, patents of inventions or designs, and trade marks.  
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The State laws could have sufficed for a few years more. Section 51 
inspired evangelical zeal in federal parliamentarians setting out to make 
the new Australia, and the Copyright Act of 1905 came from this zeal. 
Imperial considerations 
John Henry Keating,8 addressing the Senate on the 1912 Bill for a 
Copyright Act, provided some insight into the reason for copyright 
legislation in 1905:  
Imperial legislation on the subject of copyright, looked for and desired so far back as 
the seventies, never became, and was not likely to become a substantial fact until 
some portion of the British Empire had led the way … Australia led the way.9 
Keating’s reference to the 1870s is to the 1875–1878 Royal 
Commission on Copyright in the Empire, called after a crisis sparked 
by rejection of a Canadian copyright bill. The imperial Government 
feared that the Canadian legislation might be ultra vires for derogating 
from the import rules in the imperial Copyright Act 1842. Resolution 
came in 1878 when the imperial government accepted that dominions 
could pass legislation imposing obligations additional to imperial laws. 
The Queen assented to the Canadian bill in accordance with a newly 
passed imperial statute empowering her to grant assent. 
The Royal Commission reported in the same year, finding a copyright 
law “wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often 
obscure, and even when it is intelligible upon long study … in many 
parts so ill expressed that no-one who does not give such study can 
expect to understand it.”10 The report called for codification of the 
disparate British laws in a single comprehensive statute, but politicians, 
baulking at the demands of unifying the laws, put its recommendations 
to one side. The Government introduced a copyright bill into 
Parliament 20 years later but this fell into the hands of a House of 
Lords Select Committee and went no further. It was not until 1911 that 
Parliament finally passed a new Act, and repealed the conflicting 
legislation criticised by the Royal Commission.  
                                                     
8 John Henry Keating 1872–1940, Senator Tasmania 1901–23 (Protectionist; 
Liberal; National).  
9 Hansard, 23 October 1912. Keating neglected to mention the copyright Acts 
passed by Canada in 1875 and 1901, legislation which made Canada the chief 
legislative innovator among the self-governing dominions.  
10 Report of the Royal Commission on Copyright of 1878; 24 PP (C2306).  
 
17 
Imperial inactivity may have resulted from the absence of necessity. 
Legislators throughout the Empire remembered as a cautionary tale the 
bitter debate over the bill that became the British Copyright Act of 
1842. In 1905, Australian parliamentarians recalled with approval 
Thomas Macaulay’s attack, during the debate, on the proposed term of 
copyright protection, but no-one wanted to revive the animosities of 
1842. In the intervening 60 years, British publishers, the principal 
commercial beneficiaries of protections provided by the Act,  
were troubled mainly by non-recognition of their copyright in the 
United States, a problem that could not be remedied by reform of the 
imperial law. 
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that Britain lacked any 
motive for legislative action. After it ratified the Berne Convention in 
1886, in company with powerful European rivals like France and 
Germany, considerations of mutual advantage and national prestige 
appeared to awaken in the imperial legislature a belated recognition of 
the fruitful possibilities of international uniformity. In 1886, the British 
Parliament passed the International Copyright Act to allow Britain to 
accede to the Convention, and enthusiasm for the universalistic 
sentiments of the first international copyright conference perhaps 
revived local interest in the Royal Commission’s report of 1878.  
The universalistic aspirations of imperial legislators were not as far-
reaching as those of the Berne delegates but many were eager to create 
an imperial zone (consisting of Britain and the white dominions) that 
could become federal in nature – a proto-European Community but 
with closer linguistic and historical ties. In this zone, legislation would 
need to uniform or closely tied. 
Keating and many of his colleagues were enthusiasts for the imperial 
idea and they were happy to lead the way in implementing the Royal 
Commission’s report. Allowing for imperial feeling and the common 
desire for legislative uniformity, the fact that Australia and Canada had 
both introduced up-to-date copyright legislation may, after 1905, have 
encouraged Westminster to give priority to preparing copyright 
legislation. In 1907, the imperial government produced draft imperial 
copyright legislation, which it circulated to dominion governments,  
but they expressed unhappiness with the draft. The legislation was 
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abandoned and a new bill prepared for the imperial copyright 
conference held in London in 1910.11  
When the new British Copyright Act finally arrived in 1911 it owed its 
appearance primarily to the eagerness of legislators to implement the 
principles enunciated at the 1908 Berlin Conference of the Berne 
Union. But international considerations did not exclude imperial. The 
Act followed directly from the imperial copyright conference, which 
provided the dominions with the opportunity to consider the draft 
imperial legislation. That Britain took the unusual step of consulting the 
dominions in conference suggests that it may have been the dominions’ 
enthusiasm for uniformity that precipitated imperial legislation 33 years 
after the Royal Commission’s report in 1878. 
The purpose of the legislation 
The records of the federal Attorney General’s Department, the 
administrative custodian of copyright legislation from 1907 until the 
present, provide little information on the preparation of the 1905 Act. 
Groom, the Minister for Home Affairs, not Isaac Isaacs, the Attorney 
General, introduced the Bill in the House of Representatives, and 
Isaacs did not participate in the legislative debate. In the Senate, two 
dominating figures articulated different visions of the legislation’s 
purpose. John Henry Keating, Minister Without Portfolio in the ruling 
Protectionist party, oversaw preparation of the Copyright Bill, and 
though passionately interested in the legislation (he worked on the Bill 
“unduly late so interested I was”), was more interested in codifying 
principles than resolving questions of policy. By contrast, Sir Josiah 
Symon, Senate leader of the Free Traders, was interested in the 
philosophical implications of copyright regulation.  
Symon made the more profound contribution to the debates that took 
place. A Scots immigrant to Adelaide, for two years federal Attorney 
General before the Free Trade party lost office, he was an outstanding 
lawyer, more willing than Keating to explore the premises for 
                                                     
11 Britain held the first imperial conference in London in 1907. Imperial 
conferences replaced the old colonial conferences of the white possessions and 
reflected the new standing of the self-governing dominions, providing a forum for 
discussing matters of imperial unity. They were the forerunner of today’s meetings 
of the Commonwealth Group of Nations.  
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legislation. In 1905, he supplied the clearest statement of the 
philosophical intent underlying the Act:12 
The system of copyright rests upon a recognition of the duty of Parliament and 
Government to secure justice to authors and involves the recognition, on the part of 
Parliament and Government, of the justice of establishing a property in the fruit of a 
man’s reason, intellect and imagination. 
Keating earlier put the case in more prosaic terms: 
If honourable senators have regard to the condition of the present law – with the 
Imperial Act, the various State Acts, and the provisions of the Berne Convention in 
relation to international rights, all operating – they will see how necessary it is to 
have some clearly defined system of legislation for the whole of the Commonwealth [of 
Australia]. This Bill is intended to meet the situation, and in great part it follows 
very largely the lines laid down by the Imperial Commission, which bestowed a great 
deal of care, attention, research and thought to the whole subject. I think I can say 
with confidence that if the Bill be passed in its present – or anything like its present 
form – it will be regarded, not only in Australia, but in other parts of the Empire, 
as marking a distinct advance in legislation – perhaps the greatest advance that has 
been made on this subject, and one well in conformity with, and not behind, the 
necessities of the times. 
Each man provided a distinct rationale for the Act. Symon expressed 
the 18th century view of copyright as the author’s natural privilege, an 
idea that the Labor Senator, Henry Givens,13 forcefully supported: 
In common with most other persons, I am firmly convinced an author or inventor has 
as much, if not more, right to the product of his brains, ingenuity or industry than 
any individual has to any form of property. I think that he has a greater right, 
inasmuch as the product of his brains, ingenuity or industry is something of his own 
creation which cannot be said of a great deal of property the right to which is fully 
recognised by this and other Parliaments.14 
                                                     
12 This is not altogether surprising. Symon, de facto leader of the Free Trade party 
in the Senate, stated the legislation to be “a Bill of the late [Free Trade coalition] 
Government framed but not finally revised before they left office”. However, the 
evidence as to which Government substantively prepared the Bill is conflicting.  
13 Henry Thomas Givens 1864-1928, Senator Qld 1904-28 (Labor: National 
Labour; Nationals).  
14 Hansard, 29 August 1905. Givens placed a caveat on his comments: “we should 
be exceedingly careful to see that any rights which we may give under this Bill shall 
not limit the rights of other people and shall not interfere with the welfare of the 
community.” 
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Keating’s most obvious motivation seems to have been to create order 
in the Australian law out of what the Royal Commission of 1875 saw as 
chaos in the British law. A Hobart barrister who later joined the 
Melbourne Bar, Keating entered the Federation Parliament its youngest 
member, aged 29. Special Counsel to the 1932 Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights, he never rose to the heights of politics but no-one 
doubted his principles or intellectual penetration. He played a role in 
some of the most significant debates of early Australian copyright 
history and must be judged one of the most significant figures in the 
development of the Australian law. But like many lawyers trained to 
search for precedents and formulas he did not think deeply about the 
deeper questions of policy.  
As far as he was concerned, British legislative developments provided 
the prototype for an Australian law. A line of authority established, all 
that remained was to draft the statute. He did not seem interested in 
determining the deeper implications or premises of copyright 
legislation. For him, the path to the Copyright Act of 1905 began not in 
the philosophical arguments of the 18th century but with the 1878 
Report of the Royal Commission on Copyright. He admired the 
modernising sentiments of the Commission’s Report and considered 
that it, together with the findings of the House of Lords Select 
Committee, and the principles of the Berne Convention and the Paris 
revision Conference of 1897, provided the appropriate sources of 
Australian legislation. 
In the House of Representatives, Sir Littleton Groom, Minister for 
Home Affairs made a perfunctory statement of legislative purpose. 
“This”, he said, “is a Bill purely to regulate the administration of the 
copyright law within our own boundaries, and to take advantages of the 
Imperial Act, and the international agreement.” So much, then, for the 
purpose of copyright legislation in 1905. The unenlightening  
accounts given in the Australian Parliament for the purpose of this  
bill of uniformity (a bill that legislators agree will be passed) suggested 
that debate over its contents would be perfunctory. But the debates in 
1905 produced more illuminating and informed discussion of issues 
than those preceding the enactment of copyright legislation in 1912  
and 1968. 
Structure and Content of the Copyright Act 1905 
For the modern reader, flattened by the never-ending circumlocutions 
of today’s gargantuan enactments, the Copyright Act of 1905 justifies 
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Keating’s praise. It is concise and readable, well structured and 
annotated, the majority of its provisions set out in one or two 
paragraphs. The Act had a number of interesting features. It introduced 
the right to translate, abridge or convert a book,15 copyright in 
photographs,16 a lecturing right,17 divisibility of copyrights,18 a 
performing right in musical and dramatic works,19 the concept of fair 
dealing,20 limited moral rights,21 provision for expedited enforcement of 
                                                     
15 Section 13 (1) —The copyright in a book means the exclusive right to do, or 
authorise another person to do, all or any of the following things in respect of it: – 
(a) To make copies of it: 
(b) To abridge it: 
(c) To translate it: 
(d) In the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a novel or 
other non-dramatic work: 
(e) In the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, to convert 
it into a dramatic work: and 
(f) In the case of a musical work, to make any new adaptation, 
transposition, arrangement, or setting of it, or any part of it, in 
any notation. 
16 Section 4 — In this Act unless the contrary intention appears — 
‘Artistic work’ includes — 
(a) any painting, drawing, or sculpture; and 
(b) any engraving, etching, print, lithograph, woodcut, 
photograph…’.  
17 Section 15 (1) —The lecturing right in a lecture means the exclusive right to 
deliver it, or authorize its delivery, in public, and except as hereinafter provided, to 
report it.  
18 Section 25 — The copyright in a book, and the performing right in a dramatic or 
musical work and the lecturing right in a lecture shall be deemed to be distinct 
properties for the purposes of ownership, assignment, licence, transmission, and all 
other purposes; also section 26.  
19 Section 14 (1) —The performing right in a dramatic or musical work means the 
exclusive right to perform it, or authorize its performance, in public.  
20 Section 28 — Copyright in a book shall not be infringed by a person making an 
abridgment or translation of the book for his private use (unless he uses it publicly 
or allows it to be used publicly by some other person), or by a person making fair 
extracts from or otherwise fairly dealing with the contents of the book for the 
purpose of a new work, or for the purposes of criticism, review, or refutation, or in 
the ordinary course of reporting scientific information.  
21 Section 29 — Where the author has parted with the copyright in his book and a 
translation or abridgement of the book is made with the consent of the owner of 
the copyright by some person other than the author, notice shall be given in the 
title-page of every copy of the translation or abridgement that it has been made by 
some person other than the author.  
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rights22 and injunctions against infringing exercises of the performing 
right.23 It also codified the outcome of English cases on unpublished 
manuscripts24 and suggested the beginnings of the modern category of 
employers’ or commissioners’ copyright.25 Finally, it instituted a 
Copyright Office administering registration formalities designed 
primarily to assist the courts in determining copyright ownership.26 
The drafters made sure the bill conformed to the principles laid down 
by the Berne Convention of 1886 and the Paris Conference of 1897. 
The protection of photographs as artistic works, and the rights of 
abridgement and translation followed the Convention text as did 
provisions for seizure of imported pirated books and allowance for 
certain limitations on the owner’s right of reproduction. In addition, as 
laid down in the Berne text, the Act allowed for a person, upon 
completion of formalities, to translate a book if the owner of copyright 
had not exercised the translation right within ten years of publication. 
Copyright in the translation then subsisted in the translator.27 
The Berne text compelled members to reserve to the owner a 
performing right only in respect of translations but the Australian Act 
went further. It provided a performing right in all dramatic or musical 
works, although it also required that the right was to be reserved by 
notation in the title page or other conspicuous part of any dramatic or 
musical work published as a book.28 In respect of the adaptation right, 
                                                     
22 Section 52 — permitting a Justice of the Peace to grant a search warrant for 
seizure of pirated works.  
23 Section 54 (1) —The owner of the performing right in a musical or dramatic 
work … may, by notice in writing in the prescribed form, forbid the performance 
of the musical or dramatic work in infringement of his right…  
24 Section 7 — Subject to this and any other Acts of the Parliament, the Common 
Law of England relating to proprietary rights in unpublished literary compositions 
shall, after the commencement of this Act, apply throughout the Commonwealth. 
25 Section 22 (2) —The proprietor of a periodical in which an article, which has 
been contributed for valuable consideration, is first published shall be entitled to 
copyright in the article, but so that — 
(a) he shall not be entitled to publish the article or authorize its 
publication except in the 
periodical in its original form of publication, and 
(b) his right shall not excluded the right of the author of the 
article, under this section. 
26 Part VII — Registration of Copyrights.  
27 Sections 30–31.  
28 Section 14   
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the Act also went further than the Convention text – the Berne Union 
experienced great difficulty in resolving its position on the issue29 – and 
rejected English law on the subject.30 The right to adapt a work, that is, 
to transform it from one form of work to another was set out explicitly 
in three parts.31 
The Act divided into eight parts,32 greatly improving on the haphazard 
organisation of enactments that was characteristic of Victorian times. 
Artistic copyright was dealt with under Part IV of the Act not Part III, 
which concerned ‘Literary, Musical, and Dramatic Copyright’. The 
reason for this division is not entirely clear. Possibly the Act’s drafters 
wanted to distinguish between the plastic nature of artistic works  
like sculptures and the print format of most literary, musical and 
dramatic copyright. 
More likely, the framers saw copyright as applicable primarily to two 
types of physical production: books and artistic works. In the Act, 
musical and dramatic works, although defined, were evidently seen, for 
                                                                                                           
(1) —The performing right in a dramatic or musical work means the exclusive right 
to perform it, or authorize its performance in public. 
(2) —Performing right shall subsist in every dramatic or musical work, whether the 
author is a British subject or not, which has, after the commencement of this Act, 
been performed in public in Australia, before or simultaneously with its 
performance in public elsewhere. 
Section 32 (1) —Where a dramatic or musical work is published as a book, and it is 
intended that the performing right be reserved, the owner of the copyright, whether 
he has parted with the performing right or not, shall cause notice of the reservation 
of the performing right to be printed on the title page or in a conspicuous part of 
every copy of the book. 
The Berne text made implementation of the performing right in relation to musical 
and dramatic works – as opposed to translations of them – discretionary, i.e., a 
matter of ‘national treatment’.  
29 See S Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works: 
1886–1986, Kluwer, 1987, pp 389–399. The Union could not get beyond casting 
the right in the negative terms of adaptations constituting ‘unlawful reproductions’. 
It left enunciation of the right in domestic laws to the discretion of members. 
Australia took the approach, still current, that adaptation encompassed 
transformation, e.g., turning a novel into a play.  
30 Britain did not acknowledge the author’s right to control dramatisation of a work 
although it permitted adaptation of a play into a novel.  
31 Section 13(d), (e) and (f). For text, see footnote 33.  
32 Part I — Preliminary; Part II — Administration; Part III — Literary, Musical, 
and Dramatic Copyright; Part IV — Artistic Copyright; Part V — Infringement of 
Copyright; Part VI — International and State Copyright; Part VII — Registration 
of Copyrights; Part VIII — Miscellaneous.  
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conceptual purposes, as a sub-set of the category ‘Book’.33 The authors 
of a musical or dramatic works could take advantage of the definition 
of a musical or dramatic work as a ‘Book’ and claim the benefit of the 
rights granted to the owner of a book. But the only exclusive right 
conferred on them as holders of the copyright in musical or dramatic 
works was the right of public performance.34 
In the case of books and artistic works the only fundamental difference 
between the rights granted under each category in the Act was that the 
author of a book was entitled to certain additional rights – abridgment, 
translation, conversion – that had no application to sculptures, 
paintings and so on. Otherwise, the Act made little distinction between 
the two. Legislators adopted the term of copyright in the British Act – 
42 years from publication or for the author’s life and seven years, 
whichever period was the longer.35 They made no change, either, to 
rules about artistic copyright, retaining the distinction between title and 
copyright – the owner of copyright in a painting, statue or bust sold 
retained copyright after sale of the item.36 Copyright in a photograph 
made to order, or in the course of employment, passed to the purchaser 
or employer.37 
So much for the owner’s positive rights. Equally important to the 
copyright owner are negative rights contained in the infringement 
provisions that set out the remedies available for breach of copyright. 
The 1905 Act devoted 18 clauses to the subject of infringement.38 
Discussing the Act in Senate debates in 1912, Keating seemed 
                                                     
33 Section 4 — ‘Book’ includes any book or volume, and any part or division of a 
book or volume, and any article in a book or volume, and any pamphlet, periodical, 
sheet or letterpress, sheet of music, map, chart, diagram, or plan separately 
published, and any illustrations therein.  
34 Section 14.  
35 Sections 17 and 36.  
36 Section 41(1) When the owner of the copyright in artistic work being a painting, 
or a statue, bust, or other like work, disposes of such work for valuable 
consideration, but does not assign the copyright therein, the owner of the copyright 
… may in the absence of any agreement in writing to the contrary make a replica of 
such work.  
37 Section 39 (1) When a photograph is made to order for valuable consideration 
the person to whose order it is made shall be entitled to the copyright therein as if 
he were the author thereof. 
(2) Subject to sub-section (1) of this section, when a photograph is made by an 
employee on behalf of his employer the employer shall be deemed to be the author 
of the photograph.  
38 Part V — Infringement of Copyright clauses 45-63.  
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especially proud of the clauses dealing with injunctions, discussing 
them in some depth and stressing their novelty.39 The provision for 
injunctions of infringing performances were new to copyright legislation 
but in other respects, the 1905 Act did not significantly enlarge the 
scope of actions set out in the British Copyright Act of 1842, the basis 
of the British law. 
The Act of 1842 paid particular attention to copyright remedies, 
providing that works of piracy could be seized, damages awarded to the 
owner and the infringer subject to fines.40 It placed on the defendant in 
an action the onus of proving – if the issue of ownership arose – that 
the plaintiff did not have good title41 and dealt in detail with the 
requirements of entering title details in the Registry of Books.42 
The Australian Act of 1905 provided that the owner of the “copyright 
in a book, the performing right in dramatic or musical work, the 
lecturing right in a lecture, or the copyright in an artistic work … may 
maintain an action for damages or penalties or profits, and for an 
injunction, or for any of those remedies”.43 Damages for infringement 
of the performing right in a dramatic or musical work or the lecturing 
right were to be calculated by reference to the infringer’s profit and 
actual damage incurred.44 
If the infringement occurred in a theatre, the proprietor or principal, as 
appropriate, faced a penalty of £5 and minimum damages of £10, 
increased to the amount of profit made from infringement if that 
amount exceeded £10.45 Additionally, the owner of the performing 
right in a musical or dramatic work could restrain the performance of 
the work by notice in writing.46 A failure to obey this notice incurred a 
penalty of £10.47 The maximum penalty for dealing in pirated books or 
artistic works48 was £5049 and a defendant who could prove that “he did 
                                                     
39 See opening address, Hansard, 13 October 1912, pp 4410–11.  
40 Sections XV and XVII.  
41 Section XVI.  
42 Sections XI-XIII and XXIV Part V — Infringement of Copyright. 
43 Section 45.  
44 Section 46.  
45 Section 50.  
46 Section 53.  
47 Section 53.  
48 Section 4 — ‘Pirated artistic work’ means a reproduction of an artistic work 
made in any manner without the authority of the owner of the copyright in the 
artistic work; ‘Pirated book’ means a reproduction of a book made in any manner 
without the authority of the owner of copyright in the book.  
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not know, and could not with reasonable care have ascertained, that the 
book was a pirated book or the work was a pirated artistic work” 
avoided liability.50 
The owner could require the infringer to deliver up pirated books and 
artistic works51 and search warrants could be issued for the purpose of 
seizure.52 More draconian, false representation of ownership of 
copyright in a book or artistic work or the performing right in a musical 
or dramatic work was designated an offence for which the penalty was 
two years’ imprisonment.53 
As a matter of passing curiosity, it is interesting to compare the 
approach to enforcement in 1842 with that of 1905. In the 1842 Act, 
the fine for dealing in pirated books was £10 and double the value of 
each pirated book seized54 while in the 1905 Act the fine was £5 for 
each copy seized and liability was capped at of £50 in total. Quite 
conceivably, an offender in 1842 would have paid considerably more in 
a total fine than his counterpart in 1905. On the other hand, the British 
Act, unlike its Australian cousin, contained no penal provisions. Section 
55 of the 1905 Act, prescribing prison for false representation.  
International developments soon reduced the Copyright Act of 1905 to 
irrelevance. Its precepts were still rooted in the 19th century idea of 
copyright as literary property. Yet read today it seems powerfully 
modern. The style of the principal British statute, written at the 
beginning of Victoria’s reign and in the early days of Dickens’s fame, is 
discursive, elliptical and repetitive. The style of the 1905 Act is direct 
and unadorned. With its enactment, copyright in the English-speaking 
world moved away from the vanished days of pen, ink and manuscripts 
and into the present age. 
Modern conceptions shunned 
Mechanical reproduction  
The Copyright Bill contained an intriguing omission. It did not make 
provision for a mechanical reproduction right that, if enacted, would 
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have placed the Australian statute at the forefront of the world’s 
copyright laws. Possibly in 1905, many parliamentarians were yet to 
hear the term “mechanical reproduction”. Coined to describe the 
mechanical performance of musical works by the operation of piano 
rolls in pianolas, from the end of the 19th century the phrase referred 
also to the recording of musical and vocal performances on rotating 
wax cylinders and later pressed records. 
The Berne Union introduced the concept into copyright discourse 
when it declared in 1885 that a mechanical reproduction right would 
confer control of the manufacture and sale of instruments for the 
“mechanical reproduction” of “musical airs”. Strangely, though, 
considering its advocacy of authors’ rights, the Union then stipulated 
that mechanical reproduction did not infringe the author’s exclusive 
right of reproduction. It did so to avoid offending Switzerland, home 
of a substantial industry manufacturing music boxes. The Swiss, 
according to George Bernard Shaw, were “privileged by custom to  
steal their tunes”, a privilege that he claimed the Convention 
acknowledged when it exempted the manufacturers from the 
application of the reproduction right, “politely as a matter of course, 
like a vote of thanks”.55 
The Union reversed its position in 1908, but in the meantime, the 
prototype of the modern music industry emerged in Britain, Western 
Europe and the United States. The manufacturers of pianola sheets, 
pianolas and gramophones (cylinders and drums were replaced early in 
the 20th century by pressed records) came to be known as the 
“phonographic industry”, the name coming into general use by 1911. 
The immense popularity of “the people’s music”,56 allied with the 
financial strength of the phonographic industry, created a powerful 
vested interest that strongly resisted any moves to granting the 
mechanical right.  
By 1908, any astute observer could discern the phonographic industry’s 
future as an economic superpower. In that year, the Gramophone 
Company Limited, the forerunner of EMI Ltd, paid dividends of 68 per 
cent on investment. A correspondent writing to The Times in 1911 
pointed out that in the previous year, “7½ million records (discs and 
                                                     
55 Letter of G Bernard Shaw to The Times, “Composers and Compensation”, 
Thursday 4 May 1911.  
56 An article on ‘Musical Copyright’ in The Times of London, Saturday 29 June 1911 
dealt with “the vexed question of mechanical contrivances” and “[t]he ‘people’s 
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cylinders) were sold in the United Kingdom alone.” He went on to say 
that the “capital employed by these industries is extremely large. Over 
2,000 persons are at present regularly employed by gramophone 
producers in this country; there are at least 10,000 dealers etc.” 
The absence of debate among Australian legislators about the 
mechanical right illustrates powerfully how the Copyright Act of 1905 
represented a bridge between the old and new worlds of copyright law. 
As indicated by Shaw’s protest about Swiss music box makers, 
composers and musical publishers were willing to tolerate the Swiss 
music box industry’s “theft” of music compositions. In 1905, 
Australian legislators no doubt knew of Swiss practice but they seemed 
oblivious to the explosive growth of the new phonographic industry – 
and the bitter resentment that the industry’s economic success aroused 
in composers and publishers. Seemingly ignorant of the leviathan 
casting its shadow (in the eyes authors at least) over the whole 
landscape of musical enterprise, Australian parliamentarians could 
congratulate themselves, that, in passing the 1905 Copyright Bill, they 
were, as Keating said, “creating precedents for the world”. 
They perhaps felt constrained by common law precedent. In 1899, in 
Boosey v Whight,57 a case soon made infamous in the polemics of authors’ 
rights proponents, the High Court in London established a precedent 
blessed by the phonographic industry and hated by musical composers 
and publishers.  
Justice Stirling ruled that perforated paper rolls fed into an Aeolian, a 
mechanical wind instrument resembling a piano, functioned as part of 
the instrument, and were not sheets of music within the 1842 
Copyright Act. Thereafter, downcast composers reluctantly accepted 
that, according to the law, processes that enabled the mechanical 
performance of a musical work – such as the recording of a song on a 
phonograph or gramophone record – did not infringe copyright. 
Gramophone companies rushed to record more works. 
Compromise in Berlin 
By 1908, the authors’ resentment commanded the attention of 
delegates at the Berne Union’s Berlin Revision Conference. Authors 
demanded, though with only partial success, the exclusive right to 
control the mechanical reproduction of musical works. The 
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phonographic industry sent representatives to the Conference, and they 
pressed their case furiously.  
For the first time, the Union felt compelled to accommodate the needs 
of a powerful new industry built on a new technology for reproducing 
works. Delegates insisted that the exclusive right to control the 
mechanical reproduction of works must vest in authors but they 
allowed a qualification. Members were authorised to impose limitations 
and conditions on the mechanical right, with the result that within a 
few years various countries, including Britain and Australia, passed 
legislation allowing the compulsory licensing of musical recordings.  
Union members could elect not to place any limitation on the 
mechanical reproduction right, and after the Berlin Conference, the 
advocates of authors’ rights in Britain entertained solid hopes of 
persuading the imperial legislature to reject arguments for the legislative 
qualification of the mechanical right. At stake for the opposed factions 
were economic rights that pertained to the whole Empire.  
Australia did not become an independent member of the Berne Union 
until 1928 and Britain signed the Berlin Convention on behalf of the 
dominions and possessions of the Empire. The war over the 
mechanical right begun at the Berlin Conference continued between 
1909 and 1911 in the committee rooms and legislative chambers of the 
British Parliament, and the final settlement applied to Australia equally 
as it did to Britain. 
Maintaining the 19th century nexus 
The 1905 Act’s silence on the question of mechanical reproduction may 
possibly be explained by inadvertent omission on the part of drafters 
and legislators. More likely, however, they chose to ignore the new 
conceptions in copyright policy enunciated in the Berne Convention. In 
doing so, they implicitly endorsed the ruling in Boosey v Whight, turning 
their backs on the extension of copyright beyond the parameters set 
out in the 19th century. In the 19th century schema, copyright applied 
primarily to literary property, and though it also protected dramatic, 
musical and artistic works it did so by prohibiting the unauthorised 
multiplication of the pages which embodied these works. 
This much Justice Stirling implied in Boosey. He said that the 1842 Act 
conferred the right of “multiplying copies of something in the nature of 
a book”. Perforated music rolls were “used simply as parts of a 
machine for the purpose of the production of musical sounds, not for 
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the purpose of a book”. If the framers of the Act intended copyright to 
apply to mechanical processes, they could easily have declared that 
music boxes or barrel organs, already long in use by 1842, reproduced 
musical compositions. The fact that they did not, suggested Justice 
Stirling, showed that they wished to restrict copyright to the species of 
literary property.  
The most curious feature of the 1905 Act is the definition of ‘Book’, 
which eschewed the concept of a literary work as an abstraction 
evidenced by the material form in which it is captured. In the 19th century, 
material form usually involved paper, but the idea of abstract works, 
introduced in the Berne Convention, implied that copyright subject 
matter could be embodied, and used, in formats not yet imagined. 
By assimilating the concept of ‘literary work’ in the definition of ‘Book’ 
and relating the definitions of both dramatic and musical works to that 
of ‘Book’, the framers of the Act tied the concept of literary property 
(and where appropriate, dramatic and musical works) to the production 
of books. They did so even though the most recent British copyright 
legislation, the International Copyright Act of 1886, referred in the 
provisions dealing with application of British Copyright Acts to the 
colonies, to ‘literary or artistic work[s]’. It is mysterious, in these 
circumstances, that the Australian Bill did not adopt the category of 
‘literary work’.  
The non-adoption, by the Bill’s drafters, of the category of ‘literary 
work’ therefore seems to have been deliberate, considering its 
provenance in the Berne Convention and use in the British legislation. 
They – and the parliamentarians debating the Bill – seem to have 
viewed the typesetting of books as the only type of mechanical 
reproduction to which copyright should extend because they considered 
preventing the piracy of books to be the fundamental purpose of 
copyright legislation. While aware of the growing possibilities of 
mechanical reproduction they rejected the idea of allowing literary 
property in anything other than books. 
As a result, the Act was strongly biased towards the traditional notion 
of copyright as literary property – and the associated idea that the other 
forms of expression are protected only in the form of bound sheets or 
pages – when such a bias was by no means inevitable. The Berne 
Convention already treated literary property as an abstraction, like 
dramatic and musical works, that could be reproduced or adapted in 
the formats permitted by new technologies. The Copyright Act of 1905 
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therefore failed to break the historical nexus between literary property 
and copyright, and endorse the new reality of a world in which literary, 
dramatic and musical works were transformed into commodities 
produced en masse for the profit of giant industries. 
An approach “in conformity with, and not behind, the necessities of 
the times” (the words of Keating introducing the Bill) would have been 
to recognise distinct property rights in ‘literary’, ‘dramatic and ‘musical’ 
works instead of concentrating the reproductive and transformative 
rights in books, and allowing dramatic and musical works only a right 
of performance. The decision to confine the scope of copyright was 
consistent with the view of Australian senators that copyright should 
protect writers, composers and artists from the predations of 
duplicators. Very soon, however, the 1905 Act’s limited conception of 
copyright became untenable as the creative interest demanded new 
rights and the phonographic industry reacted ferociously to some of 
those demands. 
Macaulay and the copyright term 
The argument over perpetual copyright 
In 1905 Australian copyright legislators, for the first and last time, made 
law unconstrained by international regulatory norms. Not 
coincidentally, they were especially concerned with an issue that 
became non-negotiable after the Berlin Conference of 1908. This  
was the ancient sticking point of copyright lawmaking, the duration  
of protection. For centuries, publishers maintained an unshakeable 
interest in the length of their monopoly to print books. Historically, the 
publishers’ interest, the copyright term, and copyright regulation were 
inextricably linked. 
Over the centuries, the British literary mind seemed to locate publishers 
in the same ambiguous moral universe as Shylock. Usurers in spirit, the 
publishers felt ill-used. They demanded their pound of flesh and 
hedged the field with restrictive practices and yet – they made possible 
the world of books. Like Shakespeare’s anti-hero, they were 
indispensable but unloved. The copyright debates of the early  
20th century testify to the grim disrepute which came to accompany 
their activities.  
Under Henry VIII, publishers printed books under royal patents. In 
1557 a group of them formed the Stationers’ Company, which licensed 
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printing rights to members and controlled all production. In the 
Elizabethan and Stuart periods, the Stationers collaborated with the 
Star Chamber in the suppression of proscribed literature. Abolition of 
the Star Chamber in 1641 and the 15 year disappearance of the Crown 
hardly dented the continuing enlargement of the Company’s monopoly. 
In 1643, the Stationers petitioned for a renewal of their monopoly, 
arguing for copyright in strikingly modern terms.58 
A 1643 ordinance, succeeded by an Act in 1662, entrenched their 
monopoly, allowing the Stationers’ to license the printing of books, and 
prohibit the printing of certain works. The Crown renewed the 1662 
Act twice more and the legislation lapsed in 1694. In the ensuing period 
of instability, the members of the Stationers’ Company were threatened 
with competition from printers springing up around the nation. Now 
far less interested in censorship, the Crown showed no inclination to 
renew their privileges. To resolve their dilemma, the Stationers – 
principally London booksellers – travelled the time-honoured route 
followed since 1557. They lobbied the Government remorselessly, 
arguing stridently for perpetual copyright. 
The Government only partly rewarded their boldness. In 1710 the 
Statute of Anne conferred copyright on authors, or their assigns, for a 
period of 14 years from publication (renewable for the same term by 
authors who were alive at expiration). It also established penalties for 
piracy. The Act seemed to follow the scheme established for patents in 
the 1623 Statute of Monopolies, and to embody a narrow conception of 
the scope of property in books. Although the legislature evidently 
wished to open the book trade to competition, and to confer 
bargaining power on authors, the Statute of Anne seems to have 
benefited the London booksellers. They were the assignees of most 
authorial copyright and the 14 year term conferred a significant 
economic benefit. 
                                                     
58 See Plant, “Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books”, supra. Plant enumerated 
the six parts of the Stationers’ argument. Their second part outlines a species of the 
incentive theory of copyright: “A well-regulated property of copies amongst 
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The booksellers, used to 150 years of monopoly, were not satisfied. 
Although they knew that the economic utility of literary works usually 
vanished within three years of publication, they were psychologically 
accustomed to the prospect of indefinite privileges and could not 
countenance limitation. For three decades after the Statute of Anne, 
they struggled to contain their feelings but eventually the pressure of 
competition from Irish, Scottish and North American publishers 
printing cheap editions became unbearable.  
Led first by the able and highly successful London bookseller, Andrew 
Millar, they sought from the middle of the 18th century to secure a 
common law decree that copyright lasted forever. Their efforts 
continued into the 19th century and prior to the enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1842, some proponents of the bill claimed that 
literary property should, like real property, exist in perpetuity. They 
were rebuffed. In the earlier period, Millar and his fellow publishers 
met a mixed reception but ultimately their efforts ended in failure.  
The public, and authors, split in their position on the perpetual  
term. Opponents of the perpetual term, including Dr Johnson,  
while accepting the need to remunerate authors for their work, pointed 
out that literary property should become, after a time, the possession of 
the public.  
The booksellers asserted the existence of perpetual common law 
copyright in a series of cases beginning in 1750 and leading to Donaldson 
v Becket in 1774.59 They maintained that this copyright overrode the 
restricted term of 28 years from publication granted in the Statute of 
Anne in 1710, but in Donaldson, the House of Lords rejected their 
arguments. In a vote of all peers, not just the Law Lords (who voted 
narrowly in favour of the booksellers), the Lords repudiated the idea of 
common law copyright. 60 
                                                     
59 Millar v Kinkaid (1750) 98 ER 210; Tonson v Walker (1752) 36 ER 1017; Tonson v 
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60 See Rose, ibid. In the 18th century legal issues although considered in substance 
by the Law Lords were actually voted upon by the Lords as a whole.  
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To reach this position, the Lords’ reversed their own judgment, reached 
five years earlier in Millar v Taylor (1769). In that case, the Law Lords, 
led by Lord Mansfield, found that the author’s copyright survived 
elapse of the term set out the Statute of Anne. The contrary ruling in 
Donaldson, however, did not entirely settle debate. Advocates of the 
perpetual term could point out that the Law Lords were closely tied on 
the vital question of whether statute extinguished the perpetual term of 
common law copyright, and it is even possible that they voted narrowly 
in favour of common law copyright.61  
However, because dogmatists for the perpetual term could argue that 
Donaldson v Becket had not truly settled the argument about term, their 
opponents failed to inter the idea of perpetual common law copyright 
with the 18th century. Before 1842, polemicists, authors and publishers 
expended considerable effort promoting the idea that literary property 
should be treated in the same way as real and personal property – a 
personal possession with no limit placed on the term of ownership. 
Macaulay’s intervention 
Before 1842, the parliamentary petitions of authors such as the poet 
Wordsworth popularised the idea of a creative work as a personal 
possession belonging by natural right to the author. Writers as diverse 
as Robert Southey and Charles Dickens passionately accepted the 
argument of natural rights and they inspired Thomas Noon Talfourd, a 
parliamentarian and a friend of Wordsworth, to take up cudgels on 
behalf of the suffering population of authors. He introduced his first 
copyright bill in 1837 but his second bill of 1841 began again the great 
debate over term. 
Although he stated that justice demanded perpetual copyright, Talfourd 
sought a copyright term of life of the author plus 60 years. This period 
approximated to the posthumous term of 50 years eventually accepted 
by the Berne Union at the Berlin Conference of 1908, and greatly 
outstripped the posthumous period of 30 years set out in the  
Australian Copyright Bill of 1905. It also commanded considerable 
support. Supposedly the possibility that the family of Sir Walter Scott 
would soon lose copyright in his works aroused the sympathy of the 
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copyright. 
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House of Commons.62 But the proposed term failed to win the final 
support of Parliament after the historian and poet Thomas Babington 
Macaulay persuaded the Commons of the viciousness of long 
publishing monopolies. 
In 1831, Macaulay made his parliamentary reputation with a dazzling 
speech in support of the famous Reform Bill that remodelled the 
electoral system and extended the franchise. Ten years later, he was at 
the height of his literary success. But unlike Dickens, who in the same 
period was histrionic about the wickedness of copyright piracy, he 
regarded copyright as a necessary evil not a moral necessity. The 
legislature, he said, need only to look to the public interest, not the 
heavens or natural law, to determine how copyright should be 
constituted. Above all, the rights of the owner ought to be subordinate 
to the needs of the public. 
With his attacks on the idea of lengthy posthumous copyright, 
Macaulay placed the public interest in optimum dissemination of 
information at the forefront of copyright policy. Coming from the 
English liberal tradition, and reacting to the illiberalism that is a 
dominant tendency of copyright law-making, he placed readers’ 
interests before those of authors or publishers. Macaulay’s career of 
copyright controversy lasted for little more than a year, from the 
introduction of a Copyright Bill in January 1841 until the appearance of 
its successor in March 1842. The Bill passed into law on 1 July 1842 but 
only after much agonised consideration of his and Talfourd’s 
passionate arguments in the previous year. 
In the end, the parliamentarians accepted Macaulay’s arguments in 
favour of a reduced copyright term as well his formula of life plus 
seven years or 42 years from publication, whichever occurred later 
(according to a witness to the Gorrell Committee in 1909, Macaulay 
chose the period of 42 years simply because the debate over the second 
bill took place in 1842).63 The idea of posthumous copyright lasting 60 
years – as proposed in Talfourd’s Bill introduced on 29 January 1841 – 
seems to have roused him to something like noble rage. An infrequent 
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parliamentary speaker, Macaulay rose on 5 February 1841, after hearing 
Talfourd speak in support of the Bill, to make the second of his two 
famous speeches in the Commons. 
Some of his words may prove prophetic in the age of the internet: 
Just as the absurd acts which prohibited the sale of game have been virtually repealed 
by the poacher, just as many absurd revenue acts have been virtually repealed by the 
smuggler, so will this law be virtually repealed by piratical booksellers … Every art 
will be employed to evade legal pursuit; and the whole nation will be in the plot. On 
which side indeed should the public sympathy be when the question is whether some 
book as popular as Robinson Crusoe, or the Pilgrim’s Progress, shall be in every 
cottage or whether it shall be confined to the libraries of the rich for advantage of the 
great-grandson of a bookseller who, a hundred years before, drove a hard bargain for 
the copyright with the author when in great distress? 
Although his argument was long and rhetorically complex, Macaulay 
summarised the dangers of copyright in a few concise sentences: 
For consider this; the evil effects of the [copyright] monopoly are proportioned to the 
length of its duration. A monopoly of 60 years produces twice as much evil as a 
monopoly of 30 years, and thrice as much evil as a monopoly of 20 years. 
Macaulay considered the long posthumous term an evil rather than 
copyright in itself, which he thought a “necessity” to remunerate 
authors, although the “tax is an exceedingly bad one”. He accepted in 
principle that consanguinity provided sufficient reason to allow 
posthumous copyright. But, he said, reality often traduced the 
expectations of heirs. A posthumous term carried the promise of future 
profit and this promise attracted bidders. As often as not, the author 
would sell the heir’s copyright patrimony to the highest bidder. 
Thus, at the time a book should be freely available to the public, 
production and price were fixed according to the prerogatives of 
monopoly. The longer the term of monopoly the worse the abuse of 
the public. The benefit to authors was not a primary consideration. 
“Considered as a boon to them,” he said, “it is a mere nullity, but 
considered as an impost on the public, it is no nullity but a very serious 
and pernicious reality.” 
Turning to the other main argument for posthumous copyright, that it 
provides the author with an incentive to produce for the economic 
benefit of descendants, Macaulay again pointed out that theory did not 
describe reality. He declared that “an advantage that is to be enjoyed 
more than half a century after we are dead, by somebody, we know not 
 
37 
by whom, perhaps somebody unborn, by somebody utterly 
unconnected with us, is really no motive at all to action.” 
Macaulay considered copyright the only productive alternative to a 
system of patronage but he rejected the idea of copyright as a 
commodity that might be traded in the distant future. It existed for one 
reason only, because “men whose profession is literature … must be 
remunerated for their literary labour.” He made fun of the natural law 
claims made for copyright. “Might not the pars rationabilis of our old 
law have a fair claim to be regarded as of celestial institution?” he 
asked. “Was the statute of distributions enacted in Heaven long before 
it was adopted by Parliament?” 
Macaulay won the battles of 1841 and 1842. His ideas fell out of favour 
after 1905, when Australian legislators remembered his arguments with 
admiration. He established in public debate, however, a notion of the 
public interest and an understanding that rights awarded for a just cause 
may be subverted and abused. Macaulay rejected the idea of copyright 
as a quasi-sacred commodity voicing the scepticism that informed, but 
did not significantly influence, copyright debates in the 20th century. 
The debate over the 1905 Copyright Act 
The posthumous term and publishers 
The Senate provided the forum for the deepest consideration of the 
1905 Copyright Bill and the debate concentrated overwhelmingly on 
the duration of copyright, with only limited excursions outside that 
topic into matters of newspaper copyright, penalties, and the overlap of 
copyright and designs legislation. Sir Josiah Symon, who raised the 
question of term, in substance paraphrased Macaulay, whom he quoted 
generously. While copyright was necessary because we “cannot possibly 
have a supply of good books unless men of letters are liberally 
remunerated”, there were, he said, “great disadvantages in connexion 
with copyright, unless framed upon lines and within limits which are, as 
far as possible, just.” The greatest disadvantage was that “copyright is a 
monopoly, and like all monopolies, it is evil in essence.” 
In advancing this argument, Symon lacked Macaulay’s subtlety for 
Macaulay attacked the long posthumous term without condemning 
copyright itself. Symon noted that the difficulty for legislators lay in 
fixing the term but he was certain that copyright ought to expire with 
the death of the owner – a position derived from Macaulay’s 
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proposition that a long posthumous term turns copyright into a 
commodity: “an evil, I venture to think, exists especially in giving 
posthumous monopoly … rather than a long fixed period dating from 
the publication of the book intended to be protected.” 
Two factors relevant to contemporary copyright analysis determined 
Symon’s position: first, the inequality of bargaining power between the 
creator of copyright works and the producer of copyright material, such 
as a publisher, and second, the public interest. In regard to the first 
issue, Symon reflected a sentiment not especially evident in 1842 but 
prevalent among parliamentarians, Australian and British, in the early 
part of the 20th century: solid dislike of publishers.  
Many politicians believed that publishers exploited authors ruthlessly. 
The Labor Senator, Henry Givens, declared that publishers were the 
main beneficiaries of copyright law. They, he said, “get a rich return, 
while the authors very often go hungry”, and made “handsome profits 
out of copyright bought at an exceedingly low figure”. Authors were “a 
struggling class and publishers have taken advantage of their position 
and shamefully sweated them”. 
Symon’s statement captured the position aptly enough: 
And after all, we must not forget that it is not the author who derives the greatest 
benefit from any system of copyright, and we must be careful not to place in the 
hands of others than the authors the benefit to be derived from such a system. It is  
the booksellers and publishers, who may drive a hard bargain with the author for  
the copyright of his work, and who may, after the author’s death, if you make  
the period of copyright too long, enjoy wealth … intended to be for the author and  
his descendants.  
Here again the ghost of Macaulay stood at Symon’s side. Macaulay 
responded to Talfourd’s description of the poverty of Milton’s 
granddaughter with the observation that perpetual copyright in the 
hands of a publisher barred her from enjoying a share of her 
grandfather’s estate – not the limited statutory term against which 
Talfourd agitated. In doing so, he turned the argument in favour  
of a long term for authors on its head, showing how a statutory  
right of great longevity does not automatically work in favour of its  
intended beneficiaries. 
As Macaulay pointed out, the creator, when presented with the 
immediate advantage of whatever reward is held out for assignment of 
the right, will often disregard future advantage in favour of present 
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benefit. Because the first owner of copyright typically relies on an 
intermediary to provide financial and other wherewithal to expose the 
subject matter of copyright to the market, the owner’s bargaining 
power is usually inferior to that of the intermediary. As a result, the 
owner often loses control – or ownership – of the right. 
Senator Givens, who spoke loudest in the Senate against publishers, 
certainly took inequality of economic power between author and 
publisher for granted. Although silent on Symon’s strictures about 
posthumous copyright, he evidently felt strongly that copyright should 
function as a system of preferment for authors, not as an economic 
boon to the mediators between the author and market. By  
today’s standards, his solution, comprising a limited right of assignment 
(in short, no assignment to publishers) and compulsory royalties,  
was drastic. But what is more significant is that in 1905, Givens and 
Symon wished to limit the opportunity for assignees – like publishers – 
to secure, through superior bargaining power, the rights intended  
for creators. 
The public interest 
They were concerned about the danger that the posthumous term, in 
their opinion, posed to the public interest. Symon introduced to 
Australian debate the idea of the public interest in copyright. Speaking 
of the publisher’s willingness to “levy blackmail”, he said, “the public 
have an interest in this; the public are entitled to have at the earliest 
possible period the benefit of a man’s intellect thrown open to them at 
the cheapest possible rate”. The Labor Senator Hugh De Largie used 
similar language. Arguing that piracy should be condoned if produced a 
supply of cheap books, De Largie twice used the phrase “public 
interest”.  
Givens took up the theme and also contributed another novel phrase 
bandied about in subsequent Australian political arguments. Australians 
should fear, he said “a tax on knowledge” that would result from the 
term proposed in the Copyright Bill of life plus 30 years. “That period,” 
said Givens, “is altogether too long.” Above all, he said, the rights of 
authors were paramount provided they “shall not interfere with the 
welfare of the community.” 
Apart from a long and learned dissertation on the history of copyright 
when he introduced the Bill, Senator Keating remained mostly in the 
background of debate, apparently most interested in securing the 
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passage of the bill without significant alteration. Symon and Givens 
played the largest roles but they did not speak to an uninterested or 
hostile audience. Their fellow Senators accepted their recommendation 
on term and rejected the Bill’s proposed period of life plus 30 years, 
substituting Macaulay’s formula of seven years after death or 42 years 
from publication, whichever elapsed first. In doing so, they repudiated 
one of the most revered elements of modern copyright law – the 
lengthy posthumous term. 
The momentous decision to choose a shorter copyright term amounted 
to rejection of the idea of copyright as a commodity and a declaration 
in favour of making copyright the property of the author alone. Givens 
took an even more radical view. He believed that the system of literary 
property impoverished the author and debased works. Copyright 
should function, he thought, simply as a boon to authors, not 
publishers. He proposed legislation that restricted the author’s power 
of assignment and allowed for payment of compulsory royalties.  
Givens’ concern over equality of bargaining, and his willingness to 
disrupt accepted commercial practice, reflected his days as a trade 
union organiser in Queensland, but his proposals for establishing a 
copyright law that very largely benefited authors were too romantic 
even for the 1905 Senate. No-one would agree to limit the owner’s 
right of assignment, explicitly recognised in copyright law since 1842, 
and underpinned by contractual principles. Givens, though, recognised 
more clearly than his colleagues that the copyright system, based on 
authors’ rights, delivered primary economic power into the hands of 
the producers, not the originators, of copyright material. 
Considering the irreducible character of modern copyright law, it is 
worth remembering the extent to which Givens considered the 
economic rights conferred by copyright law to be negotiable. He 
viewed copyright as a plastic creation that could be moulded by 
principles of fairness and equality, and in applying those principles, he 
looked to the previous half century of political resistance to the claims 
of property and capital. But he could not alter the reality that copyright 
was a thing to be traded to the most successful bidder. Once the Statue 
of Anne replaced the old licensing system and assimilated the concept 
of exclusive possession – which confers ownership and the right of 
disposal – there could be no turning back. Once adopted, principles of 
property usually endure.  
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Even so, in 1905, the elaboration of secondary rules remained up for 
grabs. It was still possible to argue about the copyright term and to link 
it, as Symon did, to justice for author and public. Symon won the 
argument on term in 1905 (against Keating’s wishes) but this victory for 
limitation of exclusive rights lasted for only six years. The Berne 
Convention released a tide that swept away the arguments of Symon, 
Givens and others in the Australian Parliament, and drowned the 
prophetic voice of Macaulay.  
By 1912, when a new statute replaced the legislative innovation of 1905, 
most copyright legislators seemed scarcely to understand arguments 
about the public interest. That in 1905 parliamentarians considered 
themselves at liberty to pillory publishers, and condemn the long 
posthumous term as a public abuse, illustrates how completely 
Australia came to surrender legislative independence to the law makers 
of the Berne Union and, later, other international bodies. Later 
politicians accepted norms that would have made many men of the 
1905 generation turn in their graves. 
A bridge to the modern 
The Copyright Act of 1905 seems, in style and arrangement, strikingly 
modern, its provisions departing gracefully from the outdated 
formulations of the existing British statutes. Its drafters preserved the 
old conception of books instead of introducing the concept of literary 
works and ignored the reality of mechanical reproduction. On the other 
hand, they effected innovations in the sum of rights conferred on 
copyright owners and the remedies available to them. In this light, the 
Act appears both modern and pre-modern.  
It is modern in style, structure, and the new flexibility displayed towards 
the categories of copyright, and their application – seen, for example, in 
the provision for divisibility of copyright and transformation of works. 
It is pre-modern in the sense that drafters and legislators did not 
consider themselves bound to implement the Berne Convention, or 
even to follow British precedents (though parliamentarians were careful 
not to enact legislation that offended the provisions of British 
legislation). They retained a limited view of the scope of copyright law 
and adhered to 19th century conceptions about literary property and the 
other categories of subject matter protected by copyright. 
The generation of 1905 took account of the Berne Convention and 
legislated in general (though not always direct) conformity with its 
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edicts of 1886 and 1897. They did so not because they felt a 
compulsion to follow international developments. Rather, they 
supported the principle of international copyright reciprocity, and in 
any case, before 1908 nothing in the Convention texts offended the 
sensibilities of a legislature that supported authors’ rights. This kind of 
independence soon became impossible. Britain’s response to the Berne 
Union’s Berlin Revision Conference established the Convention’s 
primacy over imperial legislatures. Australians accepted the axiom that 
the Berne Union led and national parliaments followed.  
The premises accepted by Australian legislators in 1905 thus differed 
radically from those of 1912. In 1905, the legislators did as they saw fit, 
while in 1912 they accepted without demur the Convention’s authority 
to prescribe binding rules. The distance between the world of copyright 
in 1905 and that in 1912 is best illustrated by the different approaches 
of legislators to the question of mechanical reproduction. In 1905, they 
seemed uninterested in the phonographic industry. By 1912, following 
heated debate in Britain about the industry’s claims for legal 
preferment, few politicians doubted that its demands must in some way 
be accommodated.  
The 1905 Act, despite its appearance of modernity, is characterised by a 
possibly wilful absence of foresight about the new way in which 
copyright material could be reproduced and performed. Its primitive 
division of copyright into literary and artistic property and the failure 
(or refusal) to grasp the idea of property in mechanical reproductions 
would soon become untenable. With the emergence of the mechanical 
reproduction right, copyright ceased to be the sole province of authors, 
and in time became an instrument of industrial power utilised with 
ferocity and relentless premeditation.  
In sum, the 1905 Act marked the beginning of the modern era of 
copyright. From this time, legal privilege that had its beginnings in the 
control of books, the Stationers’ monopoly, the emergence of 
publishers, and the idea of the author’s moral entitlement would be 
transformed into a legal device for protecting and enlarging the giant 
industrial revenues of the music, film, publishing, broadcasting and 
software industries. 
